What the Special Envoy to Combat Antisemitism considers antisemitic - 22 septembre 2024
Medium daily digest
What the Special Envoy to Combat Antisemitism considers antisemitic

The Special Envoy to Combat Antisemitism, Jillian Segal, was appointed with the support of a litany of Jewish pro-Israel groups, like ECAJ and AIJAC. Whilst their role in creating the role is not clear, they were there at the announcement to welcome it.

Aside from serving as a president of ECAJ, Segal has been a partner at one of the biggest law firms in Australia, on the board of one of the biggest banks, and was deputy vice chancellor at UNSW for 9 years. A preview of how she intends to use her new office was given through her submission (link — PDF) to the inquiry into a Bill to establish a commission to investigate antisemitism at universities.

In appendix 3 (pp 24–41), analyses interviews she conducted with 65 people. She claims this was with academics, staff and students, but also characterises quotes as coming from ‘affiliates' of universities, failing to explain what this amounts to. Quantitative analysis is minimal. She says that half of interviewees are students. They self-selected in response to a call-out for experiences of antisemitism. This was directed through Allegra Spender, ECAJ and word of mouth. Only experiences of antisemitism were sought — not the general experiences of Jews on campuses.

In response to this, Segal claims ‘systemic antisemitism' is occurring. In a passage which is truly incredible, Segal wrote

This experience of racism is amplified for those students and sta? who are both Jewish and Israeli, and it is the case that Israeli staff and students are experiencing intersectional racism, which is directed at their national identity as well as their racial identity

Putting aside such ‘intersectional racism', it is worth considering what Segal cites as examples of antisemitism:

Every single interviewee, irrespective of their university, described the proliferation of posters and stickers on campus, many of which contained antisemitic content or anti-Israel content.
If those whose classes had an online component, a common experience was that they felt isolated and ostracized because the online interactions amongst their cohort would invariably include antisemitic or anti-Israel discourse, or would lead to the formation of breakaway groups that focused on anti-Israel themes.
Even when the outcome was that the offending lecturer, professor or student/s were subject to a disciplinary process, the interviewees felt that this was not conveyed to those who had been impacted by their
dissemination of antisemitic or anti-Israel discourse or disinformation/misinformation.
Some of the types of racial vilification included … being pushed out of accommodation by roommates on account of being Jewish and/or a Zionist; being humiliated in class for expressing a Jewish or Israeli perspective and many other examples.
Interviewees all noted the proliferation of antisemitic and anti-Israel posters and stickers around campuses which come from outside organisations.
Other students reported sitting in lecture halls where the lecturer would demonise Israel and dehumanise Israelis and/or Jews and they would feel powerless to say anything and fearful of the consequences if they did.
Denial of October 7 atrocities by lecturers and students in group and individual settings
Constant comparisons between Israel and Nazi Germany or states that have committed the worst human rights atrocities, and false assertions of ‘fact', such as that the International Court of Justice had found Israel guilty of genocide
Exceptionalism and singular focus with respect to Israel in subjects totally unrelated to the Israel Gaza war, such as architecture, Indigenous culture and history and medicine
Invocation of the Blood Libel and other antisemitic tropes to allege that Jews and/or Israelis kill and enjoy killing non-Jewish babies, commit genocide and commit apartheid.

So, the list includes anti-Israel discourse, anti-Israel themes, accusing Israel of genocide or apartheid, ‘anti-Israel posters'. It also includes someone allegedly being ‘humiliated' for expressing an ‘Israeli' perspective in class.

After this litany of horrors, Segal gives ‘key quotes' of incidents, discourse and online manifestation. They include the following:

‘I've been to campus, there's been posters, graffities, boycott Israel stickers… every single time so I go to work and the first thing that I do is pull down a bunch of posters and try and scrape off some stickers'
‘I have to confess on a personal level, every day I had to walk past big signs saying “Israel is genocidal”, right? And that's pretty upsetting to see that that sits on campus 24/7 and is unchallenged.'
‘At the moment I am doing Indigenous studies, and every place you look there'll be something related to Israel/Palestine and not Indigenous Studies. For history, you have to do an Australia unit and that's why I am doing this, and also I am interested in it. And every time the lecturer speaks it's about what is happening right now in Israel. And there is no way I could say that the comparison is meaningless even though it is.''
‘I saw a [non-Palestinian] colleague, a staff member, wearing a Palestinian keffiyeh on the 10th of October into class. And I saw this in the walkway. This wasn't a student. This was an academic. If I was a student in that class, how kind of frightened would I be?'

So… the ‘systemic antisemitism' crisis that cries out for action is students being encouraged to boycott Israel, signs accusing Israel of genocide, an academic wearing a keffiyeh, and a lecturer talking about Israel in relation to Indigenous Studies.

It may also be noted — Segal does not apply any critical scrutiny to the allegations made. Whilst there are also allegations of antisemitism, no steps were taken to verify any of the accounts. Segal specifically sought out allegations of antisemitism, and when these were received, concluded there was a crisis. She did not speak to people — Jews or non-Jews — about their experiences on campus. Presumably, if they presented a more nuanced picture — or perhaps even disagreed — then Segal could not produce the conclusion she was seeking. Instead, Segal produced a submission, which begins by seeking through procedural means to heighten the policing of political speech on campus, and relegated to appendix 3 the evidence for this issue. The evidence in question makes clear that Segal considers ‘anti-Israel' content itself a form of antisemitism, and proves this through the 14 examples (!!) I list above. Segal is plainly seeking to impose heightened policing of political discourse on campus and online, to ensure that pro-Israel students are spared the trauma of encountering people who oppose apartheid, genocide, or wear a keffiyeh. This is the purpose of the Special Envoy role. It is to her credit that Segal's very first item of work has made the purpose of her role totally clear.

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Israel's True Objectives in Gaza, and Why It Will Fail - 22 septembre 2024
CounterPunch
Israel's True Objectives in Gaza, and Why It Will Fail

Never in its history of war, and military occupation has Israel been so incapable of developing a coherent plan for its future, and the future of its victims.

Even a quick glance at headlines in international media reveals the depth of the Israeli dilemma. While Tel Aviv continues to carry out a genocidal war against the Palestinian people in Gaza, it seems to have no idea what to do beyond simply destroying the Strip and its people.

Even the country's Defense Minister, Yoav Gallant, who could soon be officially wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC), indicated on multiple occasions that Israel has no post-war plan in Gaza.

“Since October, I have been raising this issue consistently in the Cabinet, and have received no response,” Gallant said in the clearest possible language last May.

Others suggest that Netanyahu and his far-right government might have a plan but, in the language of the Washington Post, it is a ‘no workable plan' or, according to Vox, “is no plan at all”.

Netanyahu's ‘not workable' plan, or ‘no plan' at all, is inconsistent with the wishes of the US administration.

True, both Israel and the US are in full agreement regarding the war itself. Even after Washington had finally begun shifting its position from wanting the war to continue, to asking Netanyahu to conclude his bloody task, American weapons have continued to flow at the same rate.

The Americans, however, are not convinced that destroying Hamas, fully demilitarizing Gaza, taking control over the Gaza-Egypt border, shutting down the UNRWA refugees' agency and the ‘de-radicalization' of the besieged Palestinian population is the right approach.

But Netanyahu himself must have already known this, if not at the very start of the war, at least nearly a year into the genocide. His exhausted army kept moving from one phase to another, declaring ‘tactical victories', without achieving a single strategic goal in Gaza.

The most optimistic estimation of the Israeli army is that their war, which has practically destroyed all of Gaza, has resulted in a stalemate. A more sober reading of the war, according to former Israeli Prime Minister General Ehud Barak, is that Israel must end it before “sinking into its moral abyss”.

Yet, more delusional plans, pertaining to both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, continue to be leaked to the media.

The first major leak was a taped recording of a speech by extremist and very influential Israeli minister in Netanyahu's cabinet, Bezalel Smotrich.

“I am telling, it is mega-dramatic. Such changes change a system's DNA,” Smotrich told a group of Israeli Jewish settlers last June, according to the New York Times.

The minister's “carefully orchestrated program” hinges on transferring the authority of the West Bank from the occupation army to a group of civilians under the leadership of Smotrich himself. The goal is to seize more Palestinian land, expand the illegal settlements and prevent any possible continuity of a viable Palestinian State.

In fact, the plan is already underway. On May 29, Israel appointed Hillel Roth, a close ally of Smotrich, as the deputy in the West Bank Civil Administration.

The plan for Gaza is another episode of cruelty, but also delusional. It was revealed in an article by the editor of the Israeli newspaper Haaretz, on September 9.

Aluf Benn wrote that Netanyahu's plan also consists of the hiring of an Israeli ‘governor of Gaza', Brigadier General Elad Goren, who became the ‘Head of Humanitarian-Civilian effort' in the Strip on August 28

Using a combination of tactics, including starvation, military pressure and the like, Netanyahu wants to drive the population of northern Gaza to the south in preparation of formally annexing the region and bringing back Jewish settlers.

These are not the only plans that have been leaked or, at times, communicated openly by Israeli officials.

At the start of the war, such ideas as ethnically cleansing the Gaza population into Sinai were advocated openly by Israeli officials, and were also the main topic of discussion in Israeli evening news programs.

Some Israeli officials spoke of fully occupying Gaza, while others, like Israel's Heritage Minister Amichai Eliyahu, floated the idea of dropping a nuclear bomb.

The plan of totally evacuating Gaza did not work simply because Palestinians would not leave, and Egypt had rejected the very insinuation that ethnically cleansing Gazans was an option. Additionally, the total depopulation of northern Gaza also did not work, partly because Israel was massacring civilians in both north and south at comparable rates.

Israel's new plans will not succeed in achieving what the original plans have failed to achieve, simply because Israel continues to face the same obstacle: the steadfastness of the Palestinian people.

However, much can still be learned from the nature of the Israeli schemes, old and new, mainly the fact that Israel regards the Palestinian people as the enemy.

This conclusion is not only gleaned through statements by top Israeli officials, including President Isaac Herzog himself, when he said that “an entire nation out there (..) is responsible”.

Almost every Israeli scheme seems to involve killing Palestinians in large numbers, starving them or displacing them en masse.

This means that the Israeli war has always been a war against the Palestinian people. The Palestinians themselves know it. Shouldn't the rest of the world also know it by now?

By Ramzy Baroud journalist and Editor of The Palestine Chronicle.

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Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Egypt Now - 22 septembre 2024
CounterPunch
Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Egypt Now

It has been thirteen years since the 2011 Revolution in Egypt toppled Hosni Mubarak. He had been at that point the president of Egypt for thirty years. A recent article, that in part recounted the revolution, spurred me to write what follows, which is in part a critique of the accounts of events in Egypt propagated in US media at that time, but also an account of my experiences in Cairo during and after those events.

Mubarak became president of Egypt when his predecessor Anwar Sadat was assassinated in 1981. Sadat became something of a hero in the US and Europe after he signed the Camp David Accords with Israel in 1978. He won the Nobel Peace Prize—along with his fellow anti-war activist Menachem Begun. Hollywood even made a laudatory movie about Sadat.

So when Sadat was assassinated it was difficult for American journalists to understand the reaction of Egyptians to his death—which was something less than an outpouring of grief. The perplexity of the journalists was due to the fact that the very thing they celebrated Sadat for was the same thing that Egyptians resented him for: the Camp David Accords. For Egyptians there was also another issue they held against Sadat. He had dismantled much of the socialist features of the economy that Nasr had put in place after the revolution of 1952. These changes caused hardship to all but the wealthiest class of Egyptians—an old story by now. To put it more bluntly as Egyptians saw it, first Sadat sold off the Egyptian economy to international finance capital, then he sold out the Palestinians to Israel and the US.[i]

By coincidence I left the States three days after Sadat's assassination to go to work on a project in Libya. Though I didn't know it at the time, that project began my engagement with the Arab World, with Arabic and Arabic literature—and much else.

Before Mubarak was toppled, my entire involvement with the Middle East and my academic career as a professor of Arabic had coincided exactly with his presidency. During those thirty years I had begun to study Arabic and spent time in Cairo studying it. I had gotten an MA in it and gotten married to a woman who taught Arabic at the American University in Cairo. Then I went to Princeton to pursue a PhD. While studying at Princeton I spent a year in Cairo on a Fulbright. When I finished my PhD, I landed a position at the University of Rochester teaching Arabic language and literature. During my time at Rochester, I served as the director of a summer Arabic language in Cairo in 2006 and 2007. And through all of those years one thing never changed. Hosni Mubarak was the president of Egypt. In our time only the Rolling Stones have lasted longer.

What follows here was prompted by the August 16 article in CounterPunch, “Was Egypt's Al-Sisi Serving as a Cut-Out for Israel to Bribe Trump?” Andie Stewart, the author of that article brings to light a number of things. Namely that al-Sisi may have been basically a bagman for Likud to help Trump weather a shortfall of cash during his 2016 presidential campaign.[ii]

To understand why the military, then led by al-Sisi, overthrew Morsi and then thwarted the revolution in Egypt, these events need to be placed in the context of the region. And that requires us to go all the way back to the US invasion of Iraq in 2003.

That invasion upset the rickety political structure of the region and eventually led to the so-called Arab Spring. Egypt was one of a string of Arab countries—Tunisia, Libya, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen—that were thrown into turmoil and revolution. However, the role of the military in the Egyptian revolution was unlike that of the military in the other revolts in Arab states. In the other Arab countries the military stood by the government. Not so in Egypt. There it simply stood by and watched as events unfolded. The reasons for that lie in the history of the Egyptian military.

The modern Egyptian military was created by the nominal Ottoman governor of Egypt, Muhammad Ali, in the early 19th century. Its strength as an institution is seen in its endurance through all of Egypt's wars—even its wars with Israel. Whether it won or lost, the Egyptian military has never shown any threat of disintegrating as some Arab armies have. There is another factor that is also significant. Since its founding the Egyptian military has been more than simply an army. It has played a central role in the modernization of Egyptian society. The military on account of these things has for a longtime been generally respected by Egyptians as a for progress and the least corrupt institution in the country. These things explain how the military reacted to the revolution in 2011.

When mass demonstrations began in Egypt in January of 2010, the military was not among the security forces Mubarak deployed to put down the uprising. The military presence in the streets of Cairo increased, but the military never moved against the predominately liberal and leftists who set things in motion. This would be decisive. Mubarak depended on the police and security forces. In addition to the regular police, there were other types of police forces in Egypt. There is of course the Mukhabarat or secret police. Then there are two quasi-military forces, which are popularly known as ‘the white ants' and ‘the black ants' on account of their uniforms. These police deal with medium sized tasks, guarding embassies, riot control and so on. There are even tourist police who guard antiquities and accompany any large groups of tourists—when I was last there ‘large' in the case of Americans meant more than four people. But when the revolution began all of these security forces were held in check to some extent by the military's initial neutrality.

On January 29, 2011, the military was reportedly ordered to fire live ammunition on the demonstrators in Tahrir but refused to so do. Two days later the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, SCAF, issued a statement saying the military recognized “the legitimacy of the people's demands.” Furthermore SCAF said that the military “will not resort to the use of force against this great people.”

The security forces made one last desperate attempt to quell the revolt. On February 2, 2011. they attacked the demonstrators in the central square of Cairo, Midan Tahrir—which means Liberation Square. Some of the secret police thugs—or baltagis—rode camels into the crowd of demonstrators trying to break up their demonstration and break their will. This would become known as the Battle of the Camel. This was an allusion to one of the most famous events in Islamic history a battle between Ali the fourth caliph and the son-in-law of Muhammad and Muhammad's widow Aisha. During the battle Aisha sat on a camel in a palanquin watching the battle all around her as her army clashed with Ali's army.

On February 11, Mubarak resigned and taken into custody by the military. An interim government under the supervision of SCAF was formed until a new constitution could be created and new elections be held.

By this time, however, a third party had entered the picture, the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood, or Ikhwan, was initially uncertain as to what position to take about the uprising against Mubarak by mostly secular leftists. It took a month or two before the Ikhwan regrouped and saw an opportunity to realize what had been their goal ever since their founding in 1928, an Islamic Egypt. But to bring this about the Ikhwan faced a formidable obstacle. The Egyptian military.

The miliary did not regard the Brotherhood as part of the “great people.” Since the founding of the Brotherhood in 1928 the Egyptian military had seen it as their mortal foe. Nevertheless members of the Brotherhood soon joined the demonstrations—under the watchful eyes of the military to be sure.

The day Mubarak was toppled, tanks rolled into Tahrir Square and jubilant demonstrators climbed atop them and gave the soldiers flowers. They chanted the slogan, “The Army and the People are one.” It was a heady but also violent time in Egypt. Things that had once seemed impossible now seemed possible. There was greater freedom of expression and public debate about what sort of government would deal with poverty and unemployment and corruption and other assorted social ills. More skeptical minds on the Egyptian left knew the hardest part was still to come.

Very soon however a new conflict emerged between the Muslim Brotherhood and the secularist liberal and leftist forces. There were counterdemonstrations by the two sides and often these turned into violent clashes. The military, now running the country, no longer stood by. They intervened, and with their implacable hostility towards the Ikhwan, not as a neutral referee separating the two sides. The terms of the struggle shifted. From a conflict between an autocracy and a liberal democracy, it became conflict between a religious state and a secular state.

During this same period the military was also trying to bring about a transition, channeling the chaos of revolution into a peaceful process of drafting a new constitution that would provide an electoral process.

After the fall of Mubarak the military government announced there would be new parliamentary elections at the end of the year 2011 with a presidential election to follow in the spring of 2012. The military had in this period wide public support. A poll in October of 2011 showed 92% of Egyptians thought the military would provide free and fair elections. That poll may have overstated the popular support for the military but certainly it was substantial.

When the parliamentary elections were held in the spring of 2012 the results were not promising for the goal of restoring peace in Egypt. The Brotherhood's party won 44% of the seats. A Salafi party took 25% of the seats—salafis are even more a case of arrested development than the Ikhwans, since they seek to impose what they take to be the 7thcentury version of Islam. Be that as it may, Islamists now held 69% of the seats in the new parliament. People of Islamist politics do not make up anywhere near 70% of the Egyptian people. Egypt has a large and sophisticated intellectual class who lean left. Coptic Christians make up 10% of the population. And then the was rest of Egypt. Peasants trying to scrape out a living in the countryside with little time for political activity and a large middle class of secular and westernized people. So what happened? How did the rest of the Egyptian people end up with the Islamists holding 69% of the seats in the new parliament?

The short answer is that the Islamists consisting of the Ikhwan and the salafis more or less set aside their political and theological differences, while the secular liberal and leftist forces remained splintered. It must also be that there remained a significant number of supporters for ‘Mubarakism' without Mubarak. No one can govern a country as large as Egypt without a significant number of supporters.

In the first and second rounds of elections the leftist liberal forces fielded too many candidates in a situation that called for a ‘Popular Front.' Morsi and the salafi candidate won 42% of the vote, with Morsi getting 25% and the salafi candidate getting 17%. While the three secularist candidates won 56%—the remaining candidates can be ignored. Again the lack of a popular front showed. The largest part of the secularist votes 24% went to Ahmed Shafik, a retired Air Force officer who had been Minister of Civil Aviation under Mubarak. The result was that the two candidates for the final round were the Brotherhood's man Mohamed Morsi and the Mubarak hold-over Ahmed Shafik, who it should be said was widely regarded as one of the most corrupt members of the government in the Mubarak era.

I arrived in Cairo a few days before that final round of voting was to take place. This was not by design. I had been planning to go to Cairo for some time but my plan had been delayed by personal matters. Over the course of the next week in my conversations with acquaintances and friends, nearly all expressed great disappointment with how the process of the elections had played out. Few of them intended to vote. Not voting was their way of contesting the validity of the election.

On Friday evening, two days before the results of the election would be announced, I was in my room at the President Hotel watching the demonstration in Tahrir on TV. The President Hotel which is a twenty-five-minute walk from Tahrir. There were at least 300,000 people in Tahrir. I've read Marx, Lenin, Gramsci, Adorno et al and I thought this is a real revolution. I should see this with my own eyes..

I walked to the Qasr al-Nil bridge into Midan Tahrir—I didn't look for a cab because the driver would think I was crazy to want to plunge into that chaos. The traffic lanes of the bridge were crowded with people coming and going. But the sidewalks of the bridge were lined with people doing what people would do on any Friday evening in the summer. People were leaning on railings, catching the breeze off the river, fishing, watching the little boats tricked out with neon cruising up and down the river, full of people drinking and listening to musicians.

When I reached the midan there was no security. A few civic-minded types tried to direct the pedestrian traffic so a motorbike or, if needed, an ambulance could get through. There were parade barriers manned by people whose authority wasn't clear. One man was checking the ID of two men who by their looks and dress were certainly Egyptians. I asked a young man if I could go in. He said sure. I walked right past the two men who had been stopped.

The first thing I saw on was a big pavilion set up by the Ikhwan with member at tables handing out pamphlets and talking with visitors. On the wall next to their pavilion was graffiti that read, “Al-Ikhwan Kadhibeen.” The Ikhwan are liars.

I stopped well short of what looked like a mosh pit in front of a stage where there were speakers speaking in vain because no one could make out what they were saying for the racket all around them. There were street musicians entertaining small audiences while groups of twenty, thirty people snaked past them, chanting slogans. On the fringes of the crowd there were people who had brought folding chairs and snacks who were watching it all as they might a soccer game.

After a few minutes one of three women who were veiled head to toe spotted me. That was something you never saw in Cairo when I first went there. The woman pointed me out to the young man with them. For first time in thirty some years in Egypt I met some hostility from someone other than a cabbie.

The young man, visibly angry walked up to me and said, “Why you here?” I I took a moment to answer. I said —like it was obvious—, “I want to see this.” He scowled at me but he didn't know what to say and rejoined the women who glanced over at me before they all moved on.

When I left it was easy to flag a cab. The driver was in his late forties. He greeted me in Arabic and I replied in Arabic. Then he pulled up his shirt sleeve to reveal a small cross tattooed on his arm so I would know he was a Copt. It was about a ten-minute drive to the hotel and we were great friends immediately as these things go. He told me his name was Albert which he pronounced the French way—the Copts favor French names—and I told him my name. I told him I was an American and had been in Cairo many times before. I told him I had Coptic friends and that the Copts were wonderful people and so on.

When he pulled up near the hotel I got out, fished a few bills out of my jeans and I leaned in to pay him. Then he said in English, “You are beautiful. What is your number? Which in the midst of the revolution caught me somewhat by surprise. I laughed and said, “Bon Soir, Albert!”

What was missing in the television coverage focused only on Tahrir was carnivalesque air on the in the city surrounding it, the people in folding chairs watching the spectacle, the boats with their neon décor and music coming from them—a carnival-like air perfectly summed up in the attempt of the taxi driver Albert to pick me up in another sense.

Two days later on Sunday, June 24, it was announced that Morsi had won the election by 51% of the vote to Shafik's 48%. That day Wael Ghonim, one of the leading leftist activists, told Christiane Amanpour on CNN that the election was not legitimate. He emphasized that half of the Egyptian people didn't vote as a protest against the legitimacy of the election. Amanpour perched in CNN booth above Tahrir was mystified and CNN cut short the interview with Ghonim. CNN already had its story: Morsi was the first “democratically elected” president of Egypt. But the fact was Morsi only had the support of a quarter of the Egyptian people. For Ghonim and those who like him had started the revolution Morsi was not ‘democratically elected.'

The struggle for power between the military and Morsi escalated immediately. Morsi called for a ‘new' constitution with Islamic law as its basis Any intrusion of religion into the governance of Egypt was intolerable for the military. Soon there were clashes between Ikhwan protestors and soldiers over that constitution, and also between leftists over the now dominant role of SCAF in all facets of politics and the government. At the same time Ikhwan protestors also battled with the secularist protestors. By fall of 2012 a three-cornered struggle between SCAF, Morsi and his Islamist backers, and the secular left was taking place in the streets, in the Assembly and behind the scenes. All the time the Egyptian economy was worsening since tourism the mainstay of the economy, which had been suffering since January of 2011, was now non-existent.

The fall of 2012 I was asked to give a talk on campus about my summer trip to Egypt. I said the elections in Egypt had decided nothing. Half the people did not regard the elections as legitimate. The Egyptian military would never let the Brotherhood take over Egypt. The revolution was not over.

In January al-Sisi, now the head of SCAF, reportedly met with Morsi and told him he had six months to turn the situation in Egypt around. Meaning to ditch the members of the Ikhwan in his government. As though he didn't have enough problems in Egypt, Morsi flailed around antagonizing other Arab countries with his contradictory statements on the various conflicts and long-term disputes in the region trying to appease both his followers and the US and the Arab World—an impossible task. In sum Morsi's presidency was in shambles with massive demonstrations all across Egypt now calling for his resignation. The only support he had was from the Brotherhood. The showdown between the Brotherhood and the military was now on track. Even as the Brotherhood had seen the revolution as their chance to take power, the military saw it as its chance to settle its scores with the Brotherhood once and for all.

In July—more or less on schedule—SCAF gave Morsi 48 hours to meet the demands of the Egyptian people. All the non-Brotherhood members of his government resigned.

On July 3 al-Sisi announced that Morsi was no longer the president of Egypt. On television behind him were the leader of Tamarod and the leaders of the other youth groups that had started the revolution. Also among those standing behind al-Sisi were members of the journalists' syndicate, the highest Muslim cleric in Egypt, the Shiekh al-Azhar and the Coptic pope. After Al-Sisi spoke, the others spoke and endorsed what the military had done. The military had wagered that the majority of Egyptians wanted a secular state and won. In view of that support, the coup of July 3 can be seen as form of democracy. Democracy by other means.

But the doubts of Egyptian leftists proved to be warranted. Al-Sisi's government began cracking down on the activists who had started the whole ball rolling. That crackdown continues today.

Egyptian students I know say the repression is worse than it was under Mubarak. Al-Sisi has betrayed Egyptians as Sadat did. This includes his stance toward the Israel war on Gaza—and much else in the region. But now—as in 1978—the lamentable situation of Egypt can't be blamed simply on al-Sisi. Egypt is a poor country. It is dependent on the US and reactionary states like Saudi Arabia and its Gulfi friends. That dependency restricts Egypt's power and influence on every level and dictates its stances on the war in Gaza and much else.

The economy is in even worse condition. The only thing putting the brakes on another uprising is the knowledge of Egyptian that the next one would almost certainly be the bloodiest ever.

When I went back in 2016 I asked the cab driver who picked me up at the airport about the situation now. He said roughly it was so-so. But he emphasized he was a still a man of the Revolution. He asked if I supported it. Yes, I said. I wanted the best for my Egyptian friends.

Now more than a decade after the revolution, a number of articles have appeared and analyzed the revolution as a failure. There is more discontent than ever. An Egyptian student told me this spring that Egypt seemed to be approaching the boiling point again. Inflation is wild and for middle class families even buying a chicken is now beyond their means. Now the Israeli onslaught on Gaza and the West Bank has also added to the anger of Egyptians. Should the wider regional war that Netanyahu is trying to provoke erupt, the consequences for al-Sisi and his government would be dire.


By Daniel Beaumont who teaches Arabic language at the University of Rochester

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Après la vague d'explosions, Israël frappe des cibles au Liban - 22 septembre 2024
Euro Topics
Après la vague d'explosions, Israël frappe des cibles au Liban

Dans la nuit de mercredi à jeudi, Israël a commencé à mener des raids aériens dans le Sud du Liban visant des installations militaires de la milice islamiste du Hezbollah, selon Tsahal. Le ministre israélien de la Défense, Yoav Gallant, a déclaré que la guerre entrait dans une nouvelle phase. La presse européenne tâche d'analyser ces évolutions, mais aussi la vague d'explosions de bipeurs puis de talkies-walkies qui les ont précédées, et qui constituent peut-être un précédent.

Kleine Zeitung (AT)

Le coup de sifflet d'une opération de grande envergure

Israël veut aller plus loin, écrit Kleine Zeitung :

«Le gouvernement de Benyamin Nétanyahou a récemment annoncé son intention de permettre aux quelque 100 000 Israéliens vivant le long de la frontière nord du Liban, et déplacés en raison des incessantes attaques de missiles, de regagner leurs villages. A cet effet, il est indispensable de pousser le Hezbollah hors de la zone frontalière, chose à laquelle ni les troupes de l'ONU déployées sur place, ni le gouvernement libanais ne sont parvenus jusqu'ici. ... Selon les experts militaires, Israël devrait avoir achevé ses préparatifs en vue d'une offensive terrestre. L'opération baptisée 'bipeurs', qui aura probablement fortement affaibli les capacités de communication du Hezbollah, du moins provisoirement, pourrait en quelque sorte en donner le signal de départ.»

Gerhard Schwischei



Glavkom (UA)

Risque de victoire à la Pyrrhus

Glavkom analyse les conséquences possibles d'une poursuite des attaques israéliennes contre le Hezbollah :

«Il est fort probable que la troisième guerre entre Israël et le Liban soit sur le point d'éclater. ... Techniquement parlant, il ne fait aucun doute qu'Israël l'emporterait sur le Liban, mais cela risquerait de se transformer en victoire à la Pyrrhus. Car elle ne pourrait être arrachée qu'au prix d'un nombre sans précédent de victimes civiles libanaises. Cela ferait voler en éclat les accords d'Abraham, le pont jeté entre Israël et les Etats du Golfe, et refroidirait également les relations avec l'Arabie saoudite. ... Dans ce conflit, l'Europe finirait par devoir embrasser une position anti-israélienne, tandis qu'un soutien actif des Etats-Unis à Israël dans cette guerre n'est envisageable qu'en cas de victoire de Trump.»


Olexij Kuschtsch



Handelsblatt (DE)

Le Hezbollah est plus qu'une organisation terroriste

Plusieurs fois déjà par le passé, Israël a cru avoir une nette supériorité sur le Hezbollah, fait remarquer Handelsblatt :

«Et chaque fois, il a eu la preuve du contraire. On ne peut pas venir à bout de la milice chiite par des moyens militaires seuls. En effet, le Hezbollah est plus qu'une simple organisation terroriste, c'est également un parti politique, une association sociale et un conglomérat commercial de type mafieux. Au Liban, il est omniprésent et incontournable.»


Inga Rogg



Habertürk (TR)

La sécurité des données, plus vitale que jamais

Habertürk tire les conclusions suivantes :

«Premièrement, la sécurité des données n'a jamais été aussi cruciale, elle est devenue une question de survie. A chaque fois que vous utilisez vos données ou vos informations confidentielles, vous vous rendez vulnérables. Nous devons prendre des mesures de précaution dans tous les domaines de la vie. Deuxièmement, l'omniprésence des logiciels et des technologies utilisés dans les cyberattaques, ainsi que la nature des organisations y ayant accès décupleront l'ampleur de cette menace. ... Troisièmement, il semble actuellement inconcevable que le monde puisse faire preuve d'une volonté collective de lutter contre ces cyber-harceleurs. Et comment s'y prendre, en effet, quand chacun cherche à avoir une longueur d'avance sur l'ennemi.»

Nasuhi Güngör


Diena (LV)

Quand les batteries bouleversent la sécurité mondiale

Diena fait le constat suivant :

«La civilisation moderne pourrait tout aussi bien être qualifiée de civilisation de la batterie au lithium. ... Depuis son arrivée sur le marché (en 1991), cette technologie de stockage d'énergie, omniprésente dans de nombreux appareils, est devenue accessible à des milliards de personnes. ... Entre-temps, sur les réseaux des radicaux islamistes, les événements récents du Liban ont déclenché une vague d'appels à 'se venger des infidèles' en ripostant par les mêmes procédés, en fabricant à échelle industrielle des produits explosifs similaires et en les déversant sur l'Occident. ... Cette série d'explosions au Liban pourrait donc non seulement avoir des répercussions sur la situation au Proche-Orient, mais aussi représenter un défi sécuritaire majeur à l'échelle mondiale.»

Andis Sedlenieks


Expressen (SE)

L'apparition d'un cygne noir ?

Les explosions mettent en lumière le danger émanant de technologies provenant d'Etats hostiles, met en garde Expressen :

«Il n'est pas nécessaire de tout faire sauter pour causer d'importants dégâts. Il suffit par exemple d'installer des 'portes dérobées', pour s'introduire dans un système et en prendre le contrôle, entraînant la défaillance soudaine d'appareils de communication au moment le plus critique. ... Mais reprendre le contrôle de la technologie n'est pas une tâche facile. ... Découpler l'économie des pays occidentaux de celle de la Chine entraînerait une baisse de sept pour cent du PIB mondial, si l'on en croit les calculs du FMI. ... Il arrive que des 'cygnes noirs' surgissent du néant : des événements entièrement imprévisibles qui ont une portée considérable. L'explosion des bipeurs au Proche-Orient pourrait se révéler être un tel cygne noir.»

Voir, lire ou entendre : Euro Topics

Coût astronomique de la guerre à Gaza : Israël dépense autant qu'il frappe, sans compter - 21 septembre 2024
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Coût astronomique de la guerre à Gaza : Israël dépense autant qu'il frappe, sans compter

Depuis les attaques des rebelles houthis du Yémen en mer Rouge et vers le canal de Suez, le port d'Haïfa, habituellement au cœur des échanges économiques israéliens, tourne au ralenti.
Les opérations menées par Israël contre les Palestiniens ont des conséquences sur l'économie du pays, malgré l'aide états-unienne massive. L'ancienne directrice de la banque centrale d'Israël, Karnit Flug, parle de « grande incertitude ».
Israël peut bien être soutenu par les États-Unis dans sa guerre génocidaire menée contre les Palestiniens, les contrecoups économiques commencent à se faire sentir. Des 38 pays membres de l'Organisation de coopération et de développement économiques (OCDE), Israël est celui qui a connu le plus grand ralentissement économique entre avril et juin, a rapporté l'organisation le 22 août. La Banque d'Israël prévoit maintenant un taux de croissance de seulement 1,5 %, et ce si la guerre se termine cette année.
« L'économie est actuellement en proie à une grande incertitude, et cela est lié à la situation sécuritaire : combien de temps durera la guerre, quelle sera son intensité et s'il y aura une nouvelle escalade », estime Karnit Flug, ancienne directrice de la banque centrale d'Israël, maintenant vice-présidente de l'Institut israélien de la démocratie.

Une baisse de 27 % de la consommation privée
L'agence de notation financière américaine Fitch a déclassé la note d'Israël de A + à A au début du mois d'août, après des dégradations similaires par Standard & Poor's et Moody's. La dévaluation pourrait faire grimper les coûts d'emprunt du gouvernement.
« Selon nous, le conflit à Gaza pourrait durer jusqu'en 2025 », a averti Fitch dans sa note, qui mentionnait la possibilité d'« importantes dépenses militaires supplémentaires, de destructions des infrastructures et de dommages plus durables à l'activité économique et aux investissements ».
Benyamin Netanyahou a tenté de calmer les inquiétudes en affirmant que les dommages économiques n'étaient que temporaires, mais les chiffres infirment ses déclarations. Les dépenses des ménages ont reculé au début de l'année.
Au dernier trimestre 2023 et dans les semaines qui ont suivi le début de la guerre, le produit intérieur brut (PIB) d'Israël a, en termes annuels, diminué de 20,7 %. Une chute essentiellement causée par une baisse de 27 % de la consommation privée, des exportations et une réduction des investissements des entreprises.

Les entreprises israéliennes à la peine
Selon Coface BDI (une compagnie d'information commerciale), 46 000 entreprises ont fermé depuis le 7 octobre. Les secteurs de la construction, de l'agriculture et des services sont les plus touchés.
« Les entreprises font face à une réalité très complexe : la crainte d'une escalade de la guerre et l'incertitude quant à la fin des combats, ainsi que des défis continus tels que la pénurie de personnel, la faible demande, les besoins croissants en financement, l'augmentation des coûts d'approvisionnement et les problèmes logistiques, ainsi que l'interdiction d'exportation imposée récemment par la Turquie, rendent de plus en plus difficile pour les entreprises israéliennes de survivre à cette période », a confié le PDG de Coface BDI, Yoel Amir, au Times of Israel.

Emploi en berne
Le Taub Center, un institut de recherche socio-économique basé à Jérusalem, veut croire que « l'économie israélienne continue de faire preuve de résilience, comme elle l'a fait dans les guerres et opérations militaires précédentes ». C'est vrai pour le secteur du high-tech.
Mais, comme le fait remarquer le site NoCamels, spécialisé dans l'information sur les innovations israéliennes : « Sans surprise, la technologie militaire apparaît comme un domaine du secteur de haute technologie qui semble en effet prospérer en temps de guerre. »
Le Taub Center ne peut toutefois pas cacher que la situation est particulièrement mauvaise. « Les dommages du quatrième trimestre de 2023 ont été immédiats et inévitables, résultant de la fermeture temporaire d'une grande partie de l'économie, d'une diminution de l'emploi puisque des centaines de milliers de personnes ont été appelées dans les réserves de l'armée, la fermeture des écoles et ses effets sur les parents qui travaillent, l'évacuation de centaines de milliers de personnes de leurs foyers dans le Sud et le Nord, etc. »

À Haïfa, le port tourne au ralenti depuis les attaques des houthis
Le port d'Haïfa est l'exemple même des conséquences économiques de la guerre. Plaque tournante majeure des importations et exportations israéliennes accueillant des navires porte-conteneurs, il tourne au ralenti.
Depuis les attaques des rebelles houthis du Yémen en mer Rouge et vers le canal de Suez, de nombreux navires long-courriers ont cessé d'utiliser les ports israéliens comme hubs. Selon un responsable portuaire cité par Associated Press et qui s'exprimait sous couvert d'anonymat, les ports israéliens auraient enregistré une baisse de 16 % du trafic maritime au cours du premier semestre, par rapport à la même période en 2023.
À quoi s'ajoutent les contrôles stricts sur la circulation des travailleurs palestiniens. 160 000 d'entre eux ne peuvent plus venir travailler. Israël a lancé des campagnes de recrutement en Inde et au Sri Lanka, mais ce n'est pas suffisant, en particulier dans les secteurs de la construction et de l'agriculture.

Le coût total de la guerre pourrait atteindre 120 milliards de dollars
Selon Yacov Sheinin, un économiste israélien, le coût total de la guerre pourrait s'élever à 120 milliards de dollars, soit 20 % du produit intérieur brut du pays.
Il en faut plus pour inquiéter le ministre des Finances, le suprémaciste juif Bezalel Smotrich. Ce colon d'extrême droite affirme d'ailleurs que l'économie d'Israël « est forte » et s'est engagé à adopter un « budget responsable qui continuera de répondre à tous les besoins de la guerre, tout en maintenant le cadre budgétaire et en favorisant les moteurs de croissance ».
En 2022, le budget militaire d'Israël représentait 4,51 % de son économie et 12,2 % de son budget annuel total. Selon le Conseil des relations étrangères des États-Unis, l'aide américaine représente environ 15 % du budget de la défense d'Israël.

Washington maintien l'économie israélienne à flot
Washington a signé un protocole d'entente garantissant à Tel-Aviv près de 4 milliards de dollars par an jusqu'en 2028. « Israël n'a pas les moyens de fournir à la fois un budget de défense considérablement élargi et de meilleurs services sociaux, fait remarquer Shlomo Swirski, directeur d'Adva, un centre d'analyse politique. Si le budget de la défense augmente, le budget des services sociaux diminue et vice versa. »
Chômage, baisse des prestations sociales, ralentissement de l'économie : l'avenir s'annonce difficile pour les Israéliens.
Mais la guerre, qui a tué plus de 40 000 Palestiniens, a infligé un tribut beaucoup plus lourd à l'économie déjà brisée de Gaza, déplaçant 90 % de la population et laissant la grande majorité de la main-d'œuvre au chômage.

Emprunts et compressions budgétaires
La Banque d'Israël a estimé que les coûts liés à la guerre pour 2023-2025 pourraient s'élever à 55,6 milliards de dollars. Pour trouver l'argent, le gouvernement israélien procédera très certainement à un certain nombre d'emprunts plus élevés et de compressions budgétaires. Ce qui montre une chose : la guerre et les opérations de combat sont un fardeau, si ce n'est pour l'économie tout entière, en tout cas pour le peuple israélien. Avant le 7 octobre, l'industrie de l'armement était déjà le deuxième contributeur à la richesse nationale d'Israël. À la fin du mois d'août, le Bureau central des statistiques d'Israël estimait que la production avait augmenté de 2,5 % (à un taux annuel) au premier semestre 2024, contre 4,5 % à la même période l'an dernier

Pierre Barbancey

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