Trump : « Israël » est dans un grand pétrin et si je ne gagne pas, il sera éradiqué d'ici quelques années - 21 septembre 2024
Al-Manar
Trump : « Israël » est dans un grand pétrin et si je ne gagne pas, il sera éradiqué d'ici quelques années



Le candidat républicain à la présidentielle, Donald Trump, a affirmé « qu'il avait offert à Israël plus que tout autre président, et peut-être d'aucun président américain n'a fait ».

Trump a estimé « qu'Israël est dans un pétrin », expliquant : « Si je ne gagne pas les élections, le pays n'existera pas d'ici deux ou trois ans. Il sera éradiqué ».

Les déclarations de Trump ont été faites lors de son discours devant deux occasions, jeudi soir, lors d'un événement électoral sur l'antisémitisme et lors du sommet national du Conseil israélo-américain.

Le journal israélien Jerusalem Post a constaté que les propos de Trump faisait référence aux « attaques » du déluge d'alAqsa, car il a déclaré: « Nous n'avons pas eu d'attaques pendant quatre ans », c'est-à-dire pendant son mandat 2016-2020.

Trump a révélé son intention « d'expulser les sympathisants étrangers avec l'idée du jihad et les partisans du Hamas », et a souligné : « Si vous détestez l'Amérique et si vous voulez éliminer Israël, nous vous expulserons très rapidement de notre pays », selon le journal israélien.

Trump a abordé la question des prisonniers israéliens dans la bande de Gaza et a affirmé « qu'il les ferait sortir d'une manière ou d'une autre ».

Le Jerusalem Post a rapporté que le nouveau discours de Trump visant à attirer les électeurs juifs intervient à un moment où sa frustration face au faible pourcentage de votes juifs qu'il a reçu en 2016 et 2020 est devenue un élément constant dans ses discours aux foules juives.

Le Jerusalem Post a souligné que, selon un sondage réalisé par le Pew Research Center et publié plus tôt ce mois-ci, la candidate démocrate Kamela Harris bénéficie du soutien de 65 % de la communauté juive américaine




Voir, lire ou entendre : Al-Manar

Les diplomates n'ont plus le monopole de la politique étrangère » - 21 septembre 2024
« Les diplomates n'ont plus le monopole de la politique étrangère »
Michel Duclos l'ancien représentant de la France auprès des Nations unies décrypte les nouvelles conditions du débat mondial entre puissances, dans lequel Paris peine à exister.

Dans un monde marqué par le retour de la guerre et des rivalités entre Etats, que peut encore la diplomatie ? La remise en cause du système international mis en place après la seconde guerre mondiale, par les pays émergents et surtout par ces néo-empires autoritaires que sont la Russie et la Chine, l'oblige à se réinventer. Un défi pour la France, qui veut faire entendre une voix singulière devenue souvent inaudible. Entretien avec Michel Duclos, ancien ambassadeur, désormais conseiller géopolitique à l'Institut Montaigne.
L'Assemblée générale de l'ONU, qui s'est ouverte le 10 septembre, est boudée par nombre de chefs d'Etat, même si Emmanuel Macron s'est finalement rendu à New York, contrairement à l'an dernier. La paralysie de l'organisation, notamment du Conseil de sécurité, est-elle le signe d'un bouleversement du monde ?

Dans l'histoire des Nations unies, ce que vous appelez la paralysie a été la norme pendant les quatre décennies de la guerre froide [1945-1989]. Le rôle actif joué par le Conseil de sécurité tel qu'on l'a connu pendant un peu plus de dix ans après l'effondrement de l'URSS, en 1991, a en réalité été l'exception. Cependant, la Russie semble désormais jouer ouvertement sur le déclin du Conseil de sécurité, dans le cadre d'une remise en cause du système international établi après la seconde guerre mondiale. Son modèle, au fond, n'est-ce pas un directoire mondial Russie-Chine - Etats-Unis, et peut-être Inde – les Français et les Britanniques, les Européens en général d'ailleurs, sortant de l'histoire ? De son côté, la Chine hésite entre deux options : soit dominer le système multilatéral existant, soit constituer, avec ses clients, un contre-système opposé aux Nations unies. Globalement, le monde est beaucoup plus fragmenté qu'auparavant. Les Nations unies sont donc un champ de bataille, mais aussi le dernier cadre dans lequel les nations divisées peuvent encore dialoguer.
Cette confrontation générale complique-t-elle la donne ?

Jusqu'aux années 1990, l'affrontement entre deux camps – l'Est et l'Ouest – dominait la scène, les non-alignés se contentant de faire de la figuration. Aujourd'hui, c'est plus compliqué et confus. Dans leur majorité, les pays du Sud ont condamné l'intervention russe en Ukraine, mais ils refusent de se joindre aux sanctions occidentales – avec un impact déterminant sur le conflit. La montée en force des puissances moyennes, principalement du Sud (Inde, Brésil, Indonésie, Iran, Arabie saoudite, Turquie, etc.), rend la situation mouvante. Ces nouveaux faiseurs de rois sont certes divisés entre eux. Une organisation informelle comme les BRICS +, regroupant désormais dix pays émergents [le Brésil, la Russie, l'Inde, la Chine, l'Afrique du Sud, l'Egypte, les Emirats arabes unis, l'Arabie saoudite, l'Ethiopie et l'Iran], reste très hétérogène. Cependant, beaucoup de ces pays se retrouvent autour de deux points forts : la défiance à l'égard de l'Occident et, plus récemment, la satisfaction de siéger à la table de l'empereur de Chine. Ce sont les deux ciments des BRICS + à l'heure actuelle.

A Two-State Solution That Can Work The Case for an Israeli-Palestinian Confederation - 21 septembre 2024
Foreign Affairs
A Two-State Solution That Can Work
The Case for an Israeli-Palestinian Confederation

In July, U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris met with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to discuss the war in Gaza and the future of the Middle East. Afterward, Harris stressed her commitment to a two-state solution for Israelis and Palestinians—in her words, “the only path that ensures Israel remains a secure Jewish and democratic state, and one that ensures Palestinians can finally realize the freedom, security, and prosperity that they rightly deserve.” She is hardly alone in this sentiment. Across the world, leaders continue to pledge support for a two-state solution, arguing that it provides direction and momentum to efforts to end the war and eventually rebuild Gaza. In a long-awaited cease-fire resolution, passed in June, the UN Security Council again committed itself to “the vision of the two-State solution where two democratic States, Israel and Palestine, live side by side in peace within secure and recognized borders.”

For anyone paying attention to what is happening on the ground, however, these statements feel detached from reality. Netanyahu and his far-right coalition partners have pledged not to allow the creation of a Palestinian state. Even Netanyahu's leading opponents are wary of the idea, aware of polls that show Israelis are overwhelmingly opposed. Israel does not want to give up control over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and it is not willing to relocate hundreds of thousands of settlers or erect a physical border dividing Jerusalem. Perhaps that is why, in private conversations, almost no one we talk to—not other analysts, diplomats, or policymakers—actually believes that the long-imagined two-state solution is attainable. As Harris herself acknowledged after her meeting in July, “Right now, it is hard to conceive of that prospect.”

The infeasibility of the familiar two-state plan has prompted some intellectuals to instead push for a one-state solution. Under these proposals, Palestinians and Israeli Jews would be equal citizens in a state governed by a single, democratically elected government. Such a solution may be a worthy long-term goal, but for now, it remains aspirational. Neither Israeli Jews nor Palestinians are willing to sacrifice their right to national self-determination. Both have good reasons to be so reluctant. There is no common Israeli-Palestinian identity, and although one could develop, it would take generations.
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If neither the familiar two-state solution nor a one-state solution will work, then the prospects for peace between the two peoples may seem impossibly grim. But there is an alternative: an Israeli-Palestinian confederation, built on the principles of equality and partnership. In it, Israelis and Palestinians would each get their own, distinct states. They would have clear borders and the right to pass their own laws. But following a transitional period, the border would be open, and both peoples would ultimately have the right to live across all the land between Jordan and the Mediterranean Sea, which both see as their historic homeland. Joint Israeli-Palestinian bodies would govern issues that transcend each state's boundaries, such as energy and external security. There would be joint judicial institutions to safeguard everyone's freedoms.

In doing all this, a confederation would resolve thorny questions arising from the incongruence between citizenship, nationhood, and statehood as well as between demography, nationality, and sovereignty. It would guarantee both Israelis and Palestinians equality, individually and collectively. And it would help both groups cooperate on an equitable basis after decades of occupation and conflict.
DEATH AND DIVISION

Since the 1990s, the partition of the land between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea into two states has been associated with the paradigm of “separation” (or hafrada, in Hebrew). It posits that Israel can only be Jewish and democratic if it separates physically from the millions of Palestinians over whom it rules in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. In his successful 1999 election campaign, former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak told his country he would pursue “peace through separation.” One of his mantras was “We're here; they're there.”

This paradigm shaped the contours of the peace deal ultimately sought by Israel. Under the terms of proposals put forth by Barak and a successor, Ehud Olmert, Israel's largest West Bank settlement blocks would be annexed, and all the settlers living outside them would be evacuated. A physical border would be erected inside Jerusalem, dividing the city along ethnic lines. Palestinian refugees largely would be denied return to their places of origin inside Israel.

But the two sides could not agree about how to make this concept into a reality. During peace talks presided over by three U.S. administrations, Israelis and Palestinians argued about which of the settlements—all of which were built in contravention of international law—would stay and which would go. They disagreed about how exactly the city of Jerusalem would be divided.

Today, the paradigm is all but dead. The settler population in the West Bank and East Jerusalem exceeds 700,000, double the number it was in the year 2000. More than 115,000 of those settlers reside outside the blocks Israel previously claimed for annexation. The far right, meanwhile, enjoys unprecedented influence in government. As a result, the political, economic, and security costs of forcibly evacuating settlers have become prohibitive.

Confederations have long been used to address ethnic tensions.

The problems facing a separation-based two-state solution are not just practical. They are also ethical. The reality is that this paradigm was built on questionable premises. It reinforces a conception of ethnically homogeneous nation-states that harks back to, and threatens to reprise, the catastrophic population transfers of the twentieth century. It marginalizes Palestinian refugee rights and would erect hard borders that sever Palestinians and Jews from places that figure centrally in their history and memory. Finally, it offers a limited institutional framework for managing the unavoidable interdependence of Israelis and Palestinians, who—whether separated or not—must both live in a piece of territory only slightly larger than the state of Vermont. As a result of that intimate geography, they face risks that can cross any borders. There is a reason that medical experts have warned that polio from Gaza's devastated water system could spread to Israel's.

Despite these flaws, analysts often argue that physical separation between Palestinians and Israeli Jews is necessary for the sake of the latter's security. They suggest it can help prevent terrorist attacks and reduce interethnic tensions. But this argument is belied by experience. Inside Israel, where Jews live alongside some two million Palestinian citizens of Israel, interethnic violence has been rare. In contrast, the forced isolation of the Gaza Strip from Israel and the West Bank not only failed to prevent recurrent wars and cross-border attacks but also contributed to them. Even if there could be barriers fully segregating Israeli Jews from their Palestinian neighbors in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Israel's major population centers would remain vulnerable to attack. Everyone is simply too close together.

For most advocates of separation, the answer to this dilemma has been to maintain Israel's overriding control over the entire territory. This position was detailed in March by Yair Lapid—a centrist Israeli politician—who called for a two-state solution “that consists of a power advantage in our favor, that creates two political entities that are not equal in power, or in value. One is a demilitarized Palestinian state, that is small and dependent on us, and [the other is] a strong Israel that has regained its self-confidence.” But this is no two-state solution at all. Instead, it would leave Palestinians' lives and livelihoods in the hands of Israeli institutions that have consistently shown flagrant disregard for them. It is a vision of perpetual domination and conflict: the opposite of mutual self-determination and peaceful coexistence.
SHARING SPACE

If separation cannot work, and if a one-state solution is unattainable for the foreseeable future, it may seem as if there is simply no good option. According to recent polls, that is the view taken by a large proportion of Israelis and Palestinians. But an increasing array of observers, us included, believe that a two-state confederation offers a workable middle ground. It would offer both peoples national self-determination while also providing a just framework for managing their attachments to, and interdependence in, their common homeland.

An Israeli-Palestinian confederation would hardly be the first such arrangement. Confederations have existed for centuries: the term refers to an association or union in which two or more sovereign states agree to cede some of their sovereign powers to joint institutions for the purpose of achieving shared goals, such as mutual security or economic integration. The member states in a confederation usually possess independent international personalities. But confederations also often facilitate the free movement of persons and goods within them.

Confederations, like other power-sharing arrangements, have long been used to address ethnic tensions in shared spaces. Sometimes, they have played a transitory role. The State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, for example, facilitated a peaceful transition to Montenegro's independence in a region otherwise plagued by ethnic war. Switzerland was once a confederation between German-, French-, and Italian-speaking cantons. But in its 1848 constitution, it transformed into a more tightly knit federation.

Yet confederations do not need to be temporary. The European Union, for example, is a confederation that has proved quite durable. It was founded to ensure that Europe would not be the source of a third world war, and it has been wildly successful at that mission. It even earned the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012. The bloc has been successful in other ways, as well. It has produced economic and scientific cooperation, enabled freedom of movement, and promoted human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. Outside states have clamored to be let in, and only one member has left. And although the EU has established a common trade policy, environmental rules, and many other kinds of regulations, every country in the bloc remains sovereign, with its own laws, distinct international personality, and particular national identity.

Israelis and Palestinians would enjoy freedom of residence across their common homeland.

An Israeli-Palestinian confederation, like the European Union, would be composed of distinct states. Palestine would be established alongside Israel with a recognized international border between them. Each would be sovereign, possessing a separate constitutional order, membership in international organizations, and independent authority over a broad array of spheres, such as education, foreign affairs, law enforcement, social welfare, and taxation. In these respects, a confederation is, at its core, a two-state solution.

But this framework would differ from the familiar two-state solution in important respects. There would, for example, be a regulated but open border between the two states. Over a transitional period, citizens of both would acquire the right to move throughout the entire country, subject to reciprocal and coordinated security measures. Ultimately, Israelis and Palestinians would also enjoy freedom of residence across their common homeland (though residency rights would be phased in gradually and with careful attention to political and economic stability). That means Israeli citizens, including West Bank settlers, could reside in Palestine provided they adhere to its laws, while Palestinian citizens, including refugees, could reside in Israel on the same basis. Palestinian citizens of Israel would retain their Israeli citizenship and residency rights.

As in the European Union, voting rights for national elections would be based on citizenship, whereas those for local elections would be based on residence. Accordingly, a returning Palestinian refugee who opts to live in Jaffa would vote for the Palestinian National Assembly, not the Knesset, but would be able to vote for the Yafo–Tel Aviv city council. Conversely, an Israeli residing in a (former) settlement such as Ariel would vote in the Knesset, not the Palestinian National Assembly, but could participate in choosing representatives in an integrated Ariel municipal government.

This border regime addresses several issues that have stymied peace agreements in the past. It offers a solution to settlements that neither necessitates the forcible mass evacuation of Israeli settlers nor undermines Palestinian sovereignty. It provides Palestinian refugees with the opportunity to return to live in their places of origin while ensuring Israel remains the national home for the Jewish people. And it avoids the construction of a physical barrier dividing Jerusalem, allowing the capital of both states to be an open city managed either by a single, shared municipality or by two coordinated municipal governments elected by residents of both sides of the city. In addition, because this framework does not require Israelis or Palestinians to surrender their attachment to any part of the country, it lowers the stakes of determining where the border between the two states will be.
EQUAL PARTNERS

A confederation would differ from the familiar two-state solution in another important way. It would provide Israelis and Palestinians with an institutional framework strong and flexible enough to manage the common challenges they face. In past peace talks, both sides understood that the tiny space they share would require cooperation between a separate Israel and Palestine. And in some spheres—such as agriculture, banking, criminal justice, development planning, education, foreign affairs, taxation, and tourism—such cooperation would likely have sufficed. But a confederation would make it easier for the states to jointly address more difficult topics.

For example, Israel and Palestine could set up shared institutions to address matters that implicate infrastructure or resources, such as civil aviation, customs, energy, environmental protection, immigration, public health, and transportation. Each state would have authority over its own internal security, but confederal institutions would facilitate close cooperation and intelligence sharing between each side's policing entities. External security, on the other hand, might be managed through joint institutions linked to a regional security framework.

To ensure that disputes between the two states are resolved peacefully and that human rights are protected across the joint homeland, the confederation will need a set of shared judicial institutions (as a complement to national courts). These courts and other confederal bodies will likely require third-party participation at the outset, in order to build mutual confidence and avoid stalemates. They will all need to be built on the principle of collective equality: the idea that both parties are equal and that neither dominates the other. This principle is essential following the experience of the Oslo accords, which helped establish joint committees for cooperation in areas such as security, water management, and telecommunications that were often experienced as coercive by Palestinians.

Structuring confederal arrangements around collective equality does not mean the parties must come to negotiations with identical capacities. In many spheres, such as economic capacity, social welfare, health care, and defense, there will be gaping asymmetries between Israelis and Palestinians that may require each state to assume different roles or receive different benefits for some time. What is required, however, is a normative commitment to individual and collective equality and a framework that ensures this commitment is translated into reality.
COME TOGETHER

Creating an Israeli-Palestinian confederation will obviously be difficult. In fact, to some, a scenario in which a Palestinian state is built from the rubble of Gaza and the fragmented West Bank and then engages in close cooperation with Israel may seem almost unimaginable. The enmity between the parties, the extreme power asymmetry, and their blatant disregard for international law present formidable obstacles to peace. But these barriers obstruct any solution, and a confederation is more feasible than an approach built on separation and domination. Critically, it is also designed to establish a sustainable peace rather than a system of perpetual conflict management.

Still, to overcome the barriers, Israelis and Palestinians will need external assistance. There may even need to be an international transitional administration with authority over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, facilitating the transfer of power from the Israeli army to Palestinian governmental institutions. In the short run, such an administration will be essential to bringing security, public order, and humanitarian relief to both areas. In the medium term, it will focus on ending the Israeli occupation, helping build a viable Palestinian state, and establishing the confederation's joint institutions. The administration will also work at reducing socioeconomic disparities between Palestinians and Israeli Jews. This administration should be mandated by the Security Council, work in cooperation with both Israeli and Palestinian governments, and have clear sunset provisions.

For now, talk about such an administration may seem premature. The world's attention understandably remains focused on achieving a cease-fire that can end the killing and destruction in Gaza, bring hostages and prisoners home, and reduce the chance of a bigger, regional war. But to succeed at all these aims, the states involved must be guided by a vision of the future that is clear, credible, and fair. They must recognize that two peoples, each more than seven million strong, will continue to live together in their common homeland. A confederation built on the values of equal partnership and freedom of movement is exactly such a vision, and it provides a compelling alternative to the dangerous aspirations of extreme nationalists. It should serve as a compass that helps officials chart a path through the difficult decisions that lie ahead.

By Omar M. Dajani and Limor Yehuda

Voir, lire ou entendre : Foreign Affairs

Albert Einstein était contre la colonisation sioniste de la Palestine - 20 septembre 2024
Mondialisation.ca
Albert Einstein était contre la colonisation sioniste de la Palestine.

Dominique de Villepin a vivement dénoncé le silence sur les massacres en Palestine: « Gaza est sans doute le plus grand scandale historique, je n'ose pas trouver de référence. Plus personne n'en parle dans ce pays, c'est le silence, la chape de plomb, les médias n'en parlent plus. Je suis obligé d'aller sur Google pour trouver une brève qui me donne des nouvelles du nombre de morts à Gaza. C'est un véritable scandale sur le plan de la démocratie. »

On ne peut pas dire qu'on n'a pas été averti! Et pas par un quidam, mais par le plus grand scientifique et intellectuel public du 20e siècle: Albert Einstein.

Einstein avait déclaré que sa « vie était partagée entre les équations et la politique », mais ses vastes écrits politiques sur Israël et le sionisme ont été déformés ou balayés sous le tapis.

On peut les trouver dans une nouvelle édition enrichie du livre EINSTEIN ON ISRAEL AND ZIONISM de Fred Jerome, publié chez Baraka Books.

Voici quelques citations ou points qu'il fait:

• « Ces gens [Menahem Begin (l'ancêtre politique de Netanyahou) et son parti] sont des nazis dans leurs pensées et leurs actes. » P. 188

• Einstein s'est opposé à la course aux armements nucléaires et à la création de l'OTAN. P. 178

• Sur l'impérialisme : « Il me semble que nos chers Américains modèlent maintenant leur politique étrangère sur le modèle des Allemands, puisqu'ils semblent avoir hérité de l'orgueil et de l'arrogance de ces derniers. Apparemment, ils veulent aussi assumer le rôle que l'Angleterre a joué jusqu'à présent. Ils refusent d'apprendre les uns des autres et n'apprennent pas grand-chose, même de leur propre dure expérience. Ce qui a été implanté dans les têtes dès la petite enfance est plus fermement enraciné que l'expérience et le raisonnement. Les Anglais en sont encore un bon exemple. » P. 170

22 septembre 1947 : « Je n'ai jamais été en faveur d'un État juif en Palestine, mais d'un État binational, placé sous le strict gouvernement des Nations Unies tant que les antagonismes nationaux y prévaudront. »

• À la Commission d'enquête anglo-américaine sur la Palestine, le 11 janvier 1946.

Einstein : « Je n'ai jamais été en faveur d'un État ».

« Quelle est votre opinion sur le partage de la Palestine? »

« Je suis contre la partition ».

• Le journaliste de renom IF Stone était très fier : « Le fait que la figure juive la plus importante de l'époque s'oppose à un État juif jugé injuste envers les Arabes était une chose très noble. » P. 145

« Si nous ne sommes pas capables de trouver une voie vers une coopération honnête et des pactes honnêtes avec les Arabes, alors nous n'avons rien appris de nos deux mille ans de souffrance et méritons le sort qui nous attend. » Lettre à Weizmann, 25 novembre 1929

Lorsque le premier président d'Israël, Chaim Weizmann, est mort, le premier ministre Ben Gurion a offert la présidence à Einstein. Il l'a refusée pour des raison de conscience et d'éthique. Il disait qu'il aurait dit des choses qui déplaisaient aux Israéliens.

Ben Gurion a dit: « Dites-moi quoi faire s'il dit oui ! J'ai dû lui proposer le poste car il était impossible de ne pas le faire, mais s'il accepte, nous aurons de gros ennuis. »

Par Robin Philpot

Chronique diffusée à l'émission Le Pied à Papineau, CKVL 100,1 FM, Montréal,

Voir, lire ou entendre : Mondialisation.ca

A broader Israel-Lebanon war now seems inevitable - 20 septembre 2024
Washington post
A broader Israel-Lebanon war now seems inevitable.

For months, the refrain has been the same. Even as they backed Israel to the hilt, U.S. officials repeatedly stressed that they didn't want to see a wider war explode across the Jewish state's northern border with Lebanon. Leaders of the Lebanese Shiite group Hezbollah, a longtime Israeli antagonist, and their supporters in Iran signaled that they, too, had little desire for a full-blown conflict. And in Israel, top political and security officials in a country already in the throes of a sweeping, bloody campaign against Hamas in Gaza bickered over what to do about the threat posed by Hezbollah — recognizing, perhaps, that the Middle East's most powerful military may be too stretched by another massive war.

All the performed restraint may be melting away. The stunning series of deadly blasts in Lebanon this week ushered in a new reality. At least 37 people — including a few children — were killed and some 3,000 others injured when pagers, walkie-talkies and other devices exploded simultaneously on Tuesday and Wednesday across the country. The devices appeared to belong to Hezbollah operatives, though the huge organization is embedded throughout Lebanese society and incorporates vast networks of noncombatants, including medical professionals.

Israeli officials have not publicly taken responsibility for the attacks, but have in private in confirmed their hand in them with their interlocutors in Washington. The sophistication of the strike raises profound questions about the future of cyberwarfare, the vulnerability of tech supply chains and the ethics behind such operations. Numerous international law experts, including a U.N. panel, accused Israel of violating international law and carrying out a form of terrorism, no matter that it was an attempt to weaken a known terrorist organization.

For Hezbollah, the operation has been disastrous. “The attacks dealt Hezbollah a severe blow, represented an embarrassing breach of its supply chains and illustrated Israel's ability to strike deep within the militant group,” my colleagues wrote Thursday. “Governments across the Middle East condemned it as a serious violation of Lebanon's sovereignty, and the United States, the United Nations and Western countries appealed for calm as the region appeared, once again, to teeter on the brink of wide-scale war.”


A low-level conflict between Hezbollah and Israel has raged for months since Oct. 7, when Palestinian militant group Hamas launched its deadly terrorist strike on southern Israel, triggering the devastating ongoing war in Gaza. In reaction to Israel's withering bombardments of Palestinians, Hezbollah launched rockets at Israel's north, forcing tens of thousands of Israelis to flee their homes. Israeli airstrikes and Hezbollah rocket fire have taken place on almost constant basis, claiming lives on both sides of the border. In recent days, Israel's leadership has made the return of its displaced population to their communities in the north a stated war goal.

On Wednesday, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said the war against Hezbollah had entered a “new phase” and that Israel would be concentrating more of its efforts against the group. “The center of gravity is moving north. We are diverting forces, resources, and energy toward the north,” Gallant told Israeli Air Force personnel at an air base.

By the next day, dozens of Israeli airstrikes hit alleged Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon. Meanwhile, the group's leader Hasan Nasrallah delivered an address describing the clandestine explosive attacks as an “act of war” by Israel and “a major assault on Lebanon, its security and sovereignty, a war crime.”
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Diplomats looked on in dismay. “This act of grave escalation will lead the region to what we have been warning against, which is an all-out war which will turn the region into scorched earth,” Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty said in Cairo on Wednesday, speaking alongside U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken.

Though the pager attacks represent a dramatic tactical victory for Israeli's security establishment, it's not clear what strategic goals it achieves. Hezbollah is reeling and in disarray, but it may be that Israel carried out the attack because the Lebanese group was about to discover that its technology had been compromised.

“The timing does not reflect a strategic move by Israel,” a senior former Israeli official with knowledge of the operation told my colleagues. “The timing was coincidental because of things that may have happened on the ground that would have allowed the exposure of this capability.”

Also, it arguably locks the region into an inevitable escalatory chain. “Even if they were trying to send a message, why now?” a Middle East-based security official told my colleagues, also speaking on the condition of anonymity. “There will be a reaction from Hezbollah. Why do this if you are truly interested in preventing a wider war?”

Some Israeli and Western policymakers have hoped to delink the conflict with Hamas from tensions with Hezbollah. But the current course of events makes that harder. “Israel is poised to visit greater violence on Hezbollah in the hope of forcing it into ceasing cross border fire,” Firas Maksad, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute, told me. “However, Hezbollah cannot yield without undermining the much vaunted ‘unity of fronts' it and Iran proclaimed after October 7. The broadening of the war has, therefore, become inevitable.”
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For Israel, much of the deliberation over what to do hinges on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's calculations about maintaining power. The right-wing leader has appeased his far-right coalition through various stages of the war, even though some analysts suggest he may have preferred a de-escalation along the northern border at one point. “It is not about what Netanyahu wants but who has the leverage to drag Netanyahu into doing what they want,” Gayil Talshir, a professor of political science at Hebrew University, told my colleagues. “And his most extremist supporters want Israel having a military occupation of Gaza and a security zone in the southern part of Lebanon.”

Earlier in the week, Netanyahu met with White House adviser Amos Hochstein, who was in Israel in part to urge restraint over Lebanon. “While Israel appreciates and respects the support of the United States, it will — ultimately — do what is necessary to safeguard its security,” Netanyahu told Hochstein, according to a statement from the prime minister's office.

By Ishaan Tharoor with Kelsey Baker

Voir, lire ou entendre : Washington post